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One of the primary training tools available to a Joint Commander-in-Chief (CINC)
for training his staff on their joint mission essential tasks is a command post exercise
supported by a computer simulation model. Computer Aided Exercises (CAXs) are an
essential part of training a component staff, however, one weakness lies in the
measurement of the level of training received by the players. In most CAXs the players
rapidly disperse after the exercise and not only is no quantitative data captured, but in
most cases they don't receive a detailed debrief This research presents a methodology for
evaluating the performance of joint mobilization tasks as set forth in the Universal Joint
Task List (UJTL) The UJTL provides both the staff and evaluators with a common
document outlining the critical events and activities which require successful
accomplishment. The UJTL is organized in such a manner which defines activities such as
logistics, intelligence, and force protection
It is the purpose of this thesis to provide a methodology for objectively assessing
the effectiveness of a staffs joint mobilization plan Experimental runs using the Joint
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
One of the primary training tools available to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) for
training his staff on their joint mission essential tasks is a command post exercise
supported by a computer simulation model. This is commonly referred to as a Computer
Aided Exercise (CAX). The main objective of a CAX is to create an environment where
the staff can implement plans, update those plans as required, and make decisions based
upon stochastic results One weakness of the CAX lies in the measurement of the level of
training received by the players In most CAXs the players rapidly disperse after the
exercise, and not only is no quantitative data captured but in most cases they don't
receive a detailed debrief Evaluating the performance of the players is important because
it provides feedback as to how effective the training plan is and it identifies mission
essential in need of training.
The objective of this thesis is to develop an after action reporting process (AARP)
for representing CINC staff performance in the execution ofjoint tasks during the conduct
CAX. For this thesis, the CAX will be conducted using the Joint Theater Level
Simulation (JTLS), focusing on Strategic National Tasks One, Six and Seven which all
deal with strategic deployment of forces into a theater Specific objectives are:
A. Develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) that summarize mobilization
planning and execution conducted during a CAX. CINCs are tasked with developing
OPLANS and supporting Mobilization plans Included within a mobilization plan is Time
Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) A TPFDD lists assigned, augmented, and
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supporting forces scheduled to arrive into a theater along with each unit's required arrival
date Individual force requirements are usually expressed in battalion sized units. This
Thesis will attempt to show how a specific TPFDD influenced the outcome ofthe war.
How does the particular mix of forces compare to the enemy's mix of forces in theater at
any given time ? This will be done by examining specific sets of friendly and enemy
units on hand at particular critical times during the CAX and develop measures to
compare them (For example Was the outcome ofthe war affected because several ships
carrying troops were sunk by enemy submarines and never arrived in theater ?)
B Evaluate the MOEs with data collected from an actual CAX
C. Develop the AARP based on graphical presentation ofthe MOEs gathered
during a CAX
The methodology is not intended to assess execution ofjoint tasks. Its focus is on
evaluating process performance that ultimately is used to provide insight into significant
events observed during the CAX. Implementation of the methodology presented places
no additional burden on the players, because no special player interaction is required. The
entire methodology can be implemented using only a commercial spreadsheet package and
thus is conducive to production of a quick analysis capable ofbeing presented to the
players before the disperse at the end of the exercise.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Memorandum of Policy 26 (MOP 26)
establishes a program for carrying out the joint training responsibilities of the CJCS, the
Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), and the CINC's component staffs. MOP 26
institutes a method for identifying training requirements through the review of the CINC's
mission and the compilation of the Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) A CINC's
JMETL is intended to provide the basis for all joint training
The Universal Joint Task List (MCM 147-93), a supplement to the Joint Training
Manual (MCM 71-92), is a comprehensive listing of all joint tasks pertaining to the Armed
Forces of the United States It is intended to provide a common language for describing
joint warfighting capabilities throughout the entire range of military operations to include
operations other than war Specifically, tasks are defined as they relate to the strategic
(both national and theater), operational, and tactical levels of war. Each joint task is
broken down into supporting tasks which may in turn be further refined into enabling
tasks
One of the primary training tools available to a CINC for training his staff on their
joint mission essential tasks is a command post exercise supported by a computer
simulation model This is commonly referred to as a Computer Aided Exercise (CAX)
The primary role of the computer simulation is to present a decision environment within
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which the staff can be presented with realistic, stochastic results. Based upon this
simulated environment, staffs implement plans, monitor the current situation, and further
develop or alter their plans as dictated by changing requirements. CAXs are an essential
part of training a component staff, however, one weakness of these valuable training
tools lies in the measurement of the level of training received by the players. In most
CAXs the players rapidly disperse after the exercise and little quantitative data are
captured during the running of the exercise that will allow for quick post exercise analysis.
Measurement of a staffs capability to perform mission essential tasks is ultimately
important for two reasons. First, it is important to insure that training resources are being
used wisely and progress is being realized in the training program. Second, it is important
to determine the tasks for which there exists the greatest need for further training [Ref. 1]
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The objective of this thesis is to develop an exercise analysis methodology for
evaluating CINC staff performance in the execution ofjoint tasks during the conduct of a
CAX, focusing on Strategic National Tasks One, Six, Seven which deal with strategic
deployment and redeployment of forces into and out of a theater. Specific objectives are
as follows.
1) Develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) that summarize
mobilization planning and execution conducted during a CAX CINCs are
tasked with developing OPLANS and supporting Mobilization plans, which
include a Time Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) A TPFDD lists
assigned, augmented and supporting forces scheduled to arrive into a
theater along with each unit's required arrival date Individual force
requirements are usually expressed in battalion sized units This thesis
shows how execution of a specific TPFDD influenced the outcome of the
war This was done by examining, over time, the relative distances
between the strength weighted centers of mass of the two opposing forces.
For example, was the outcome of the war affected because several ships
carrying troops were sunk by enemy submarines and never arrived in
theater?
2) Test the methodology using the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS).
Develop and demonstrate a potential post-exercise analysis. This objective
entails a practical application of the methodology presented here to an
existing theater level simulation Included in this are the alignment of the
model's database with required parameters necessary for utilizing the
methodology, development of algorithms required in post processing and
specification of output format.
This research parallels similar efforts by Capt Kerry Gordon, USMC [Ref. 2], on
Universal Joint Tasks involving firepower, LT John Mustin, USN, [Ref 3] involving
force protection ofNaval units, CPT Kevin Brown, USA, [Ref. 4] on tasks involving
mobility of maneuver units, CPT John Thurman, USA, [Ref 5] on tasks involving force
protection, and Maj Mark Cwick, USMC, [Ref 6] on tasks involving amphibious
operations. It is recommended that these additional theses be read in conjunction with this
document, since the performance of one joint task during a CAX often impacts the
performance of another joint task. The interested reader is also referred to the Naval
Postgraduate School Technical Report entitled Evaluation ofFunctional Area
Performance in Internal Look 96, for a practical application of these methodologies in
analyzing a Central Command exercise.
C. THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter II provides a brief overview of the mobilization planning process. Chapter
III describes the proposed analysis methodology used to assess staff performance. The
presented methodology focuses on the analysis of significant events that occur during an
exercise Chapter IV applies the methodology to a typical exercise scenario using JTLS.
This chapter discusses the data manipulation necessary for post exercise analysis using an
existing computer simulation. Chapter V summarizes the methodology and provides
recommendations for further refinements and analysis.
II. JOINT TRAINING PROCESS
"Train and exercise today's forces on today's equipment with today's doctrine ...
General Shalikashvili, CJCS
The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team Joint force
Commanders choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space, and special
operations forces at their disposal. [Ref. 7] In order to fight successfully the resulting joint
team needs to train as an integrated force. Critical to ensuring effectiveness is recognition
that the military is a "hands-on profession." Leaders at all levels do most of their learning
during training, thus making "realistic, demanding, and objectively measured training and
exercises a must " [Ref 7]
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (UJTL)
The latest version of the UJTL was developed by Dynamics Research Corporation
(DRC) under the direction of the Joint Exercise and Training Division (JETD) of the J-7
Directorate, the Joint Staff The project was a two year effort which leveraged Army
lessons learned on similar activities. Over 120 organizations provided design input, all of
which were coordinated through the Joint Staff, CINCs, Services, and other concerned
agencies. The UJTL provides a common language for describing joint warfighting
capabilities in terms of tasks, conditions and standards. Furthermore, capabilities within it
describe the entire range of military operations, to include operations other than war
[Ref 1]
The UJTL is divided into four levels ofwar as follows:
• Strategic National (SN) - The level ofwar at which a nation determines national
or multinational security objectives and develops and uses national resources to
accomplish these objectives.
• Strategic Theater (ST) - Similar to Strategic National except assets are allocated
to achieve theater specific objectives.
• Operational (OP) - The level ofwar at which campaigns and major operations
are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters of
operation.
• Tactical (TA) - The level at which battles and engagements are planned and
executed involving units at a tactical level
The UJTL contains the joint task list, joint conditions list and associated task
measures. Figure 1 describes the joint task list which consists of all joint, supporting and
enabling tasks at each of the three levels of war. The joint conditions list contains various
physical, political, social and military states that describe operational environments
Descriptive measures are parameters describing task performance that, when specified in
terms of conditions and a minimum acceptable level of performance, are a statement of the
task's standard The joint measures list provides performance criteria at the task level to
assist commanders in assessing staff performance and determining those tasks in greatest
need of additional training [Ref. 8]
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Figure 1 Universal Joint Task List Diagram
B. JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (JMETL)
Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMET) are selected from among the tasks found in
the UJTL. Tasks that are identified as essential to the accomplishment of the combatant
commander's mission are compiled in the Joint Mission Essential Tasks List (JMETL). A
CINC's JMETL is intended to provide the basis for all joint training

C. JOINT TRAINING PROGRAM
The art of war owns certain elements and fixed
principles We must acquire that theory, and lodge
it in our heads- otherwise we will never get very far.
Frederick the Great [Ref 9]
The joint training program provides guidance for all joint training within the
DOD. Required national capabilities are specified in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSCP) as determined through analysis of international obligations and Operations Plans
(OPLANS) The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to coordinate
the deliberate planning efforts of the combatant commanders in pursuit
of national strategic objectives and to integrate their efforts with those of the remainder of
the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JSCP is the link between
strategic planning and joint operation planning It is the primary vehicle through which
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises his responsibility to provide for the
preparation of operation plans The JSCP initiates deliberate planning by assigning
planning tasks to the combatant commanders, apportioning major combat forces and
resources, and issuing planning guidance to integrate the joint operation planning
activities of the entire JPEC within a coherent focused framework.
Essential capabilities are reflected in the CINC's Joint Mission Essential Task List
which identifies his priorities and provides the collective requirements base for all joint
training Along with the JMETL, applicable Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques
and Procedures (JTTP) are used to develop a CINC's training plan The overall effect of
the joint training program is to effectively link joint training and joint doctrine to create an
efficient joint fighting force
D. JOINT MOBILIZATION PLANNING
The Greeks by their laws, and the Romans by the
spirit of their people, took care to put into the
hands of their rulers no such engine of oppression
as a standing army. Their system was to make
every man a soldier, and oblige him to the standard
of his country whenever that was reared This
made them invincible, and the same remedy will
make us so. Thomas Jefferson [Ref 9]
Mobilization planning is heavily influenced by the JSCP which tasks the combatant
commanders and their Service components to develop OPLANS and supporting
mobilization plans JSCP provides guidance, assigns tasks, apportions major combat
forces and specifies items of material and lift assets available for planning Procedures for
deliberate planning are designed to assist the JPEC in the timely, efficient development of
OPLANS and to provide a consistent framework for the planning process. The deliberate
planning process consists of five phases.
1. Phase I - Initiation
During this phase the groundwork is laid for the planning process. Planning tasks
are assigned and available resources are identified. The CJCS tasks CINCs to develop
operation plans and concept summaries which are usually incorporated into the unit's next
JSCP. CINCs are given wide latitude to make whatever plans are necessary to accomplish
the assigned task. The assigned CENC is encouraged to consult with the Joint Center for
Lessons Learned (JCLL) as well as the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS)
to obtain specific practical lessons learned from similar mobilization plans [Ref 10]
2. Phase II - Concept Development
During this phase the JSCP tasking is analyzed and factors that possibly could
affect mission accomplishment are identified and addressed in the CINCs mission
statement. The CINCs mission statement is issued to subordinate and supporting
commanders and contains such things as characteristics of the area of operations, enemy
capabilities, special weapons, political and psychological considerations and a tentative
planning schedule The CINCs staff, together with subordinate and supporting
commanders, then develops Courses Of Action (COA), which are eventually smoothed
into the CINCs concept which, after submission to and approved by CJCS, becomes the
concept of operations for the plan. The CINCs concept forms the cornerstone for what
later becomes the Operations Plan in Concept Form (CONPLAN) [Ref 10]
3. Phase III - Plan Development
The plan development phase is the phase where the forces are selected and time-
phased, support requirements computed, strategic deployments are simulated and
analyzed, and shortfalls are identified. The entire process is summarized in Table 1
.
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STEP 1 FORCE PLANNING
STEP 2 SUPPORT PLANNING
STEP 3 NUCLEAR PLANNING
STEP 4 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
STEP 5 SHORTFALL IDENTIFICATION
STEP 6 TRANSPORTATION FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
STEP 7 TPFDD REFINEMENT
STEP 8 DOCUMENTATION
• STEPS LISTED ABOVE ARE NOT NECESSARILY SEQUENTIAL AND MAY OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY
Table 1 . Plan Development Phase
Major combat forces apportioned to the CINC are designated in the JSCP and are
used in this phase to time phase their force lists to sequence the arrival of forces into a
theater in accordance with a visualized concept of operations. TPFDD force data include
assigned, augmented and supporting forces to be deployed to the area of operations along
with forces already on station in the area of operations. Individual force requirements will
be expressed at the highest practicable unit level. For instance, a battalion-size unit
consisting of a headquarters and subordinate units is shown as a single unit as long as they
are moving from the same Port of Embarkation (POE) to the same Port of Debarkation




ARMY . Division, Separate Brigade, Armored Cavalry Regiment
2. AIR FORCE Combat Squadrons, including their sortie and sortie generation support
3. NAVY
.
Carrier Battle Group, Surface Action Group, Amphibious Ready Group.
4. MARINE CORPS Marine Expeditionary Force, Marine Expeditionary Brigade,
Separate Marine Expeditionary Units, Air Contingency Units.
5. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES . Army, Navy, and Air Force Special operations
forces and their organic support units.
Table 2. Definitions of Forces
4. Phase IV - Plan Review
In this phase, all elements of the OPLAN and CONPLAN are reviewed and
approved by the CJCS. The CINC revises the plan in accordance with any comments
made by the CJCS.
5. Phase V - Supporting Plans
In the final phase all required supporting plans are completed and validated. Any
changes to the TPFDD can only be made with Joint Staff approval during this phase
A methodology for assisting the commander and his staff in evaluating the
effectiveness of a mobilization plan during a CAX is described in the next chapter. A




This chapter presents a methodology for developing quantifiable measures of
effectiveness for assessing mobilization functions described in terms of the appropriate
Universal Joint Tasks. Fundamental to the methodology is the assumption that execution
of any given task at a specific level of war is related to the execution of similar tasks at
other levels of war. Tasks at different levels can be related to each other by means of a
common functionality Out of this functional relationship comes the concept of horizontal
and vertical linkages existing among tasks A horizontal linkage is defined in the context
of a military operation That is, when conducting a military operation, different tasks
(processing movement requirements, movement to Port of Embarkation (POE),
movement to Port of Debarkation (POD), movements within Theater) have to be
performed in careful coordination with one another to achieve the desired effects. The
coordination among such tasks may be in terms of timing, space or degree
One way of describing these horizontal linkages is through operations templates
which are described later in this chapter. An example of a horizontal linkage between
tasks is the relationship between UJTL Strategic National task "Conduct Mobilization"
(SN 6) and UJTL Strategic National task "Establish Theater force requirements and
readiness" (SN 7). The basis for linking these tasks is that the accomplishment of both
tasks must be synchronized in time, space, and degree based on the commander's concept
of operations in accordance with joint doctrine
Vertical linkages provide the connecting structure among tasks in the UJTL
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across strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war Although the generic elements of
strategic, operational, and tactical mobilization planning are similar, the tasks and
subtasks associated with each are distinct in terms of aim, scope and what organization is
assigned to perform them. At the strategic level mobilization plans are developed which
assemble and organize national resources to support national objectives in time ofwar or
other emergencies. This task includes activating all or part of the reserve components
(RC), as well as organizing supplies and materiel. This thesis concentrates on evaluating
both the planning and execution of mobilization plans by Joint Warfare Commanders at a
strategic level
Specific steps of the methodology include developing operations templates,
relating issues to performance requirements (dendritic) and determining measures of
performance and effectiveness.
A. OPERATIONS TEMPLATES
An operations template provides a graphical depiction of the activities performed
as part of a military operation. It depicts activities and interrelationships among those
activities. The activities represented in an operations template vary from tasks performed
by the joint warfare commander and staff to subordinate commanders. Operations
templates represent various interactions and interdependences among tasks that influence
their combined effect on mission success Templates are especially useful in understanding
the performance relationships among tasks in the context of the commander's concept of
14
operations Operations templates aid the joint force commander in identifying the most
essential warfighting tasks and incorporating them into the training plan in advance of
actually conducting such military operations.
Operation templates depict two types of interrelationships among tasks One type
is temporal relationships in which either one task has to be completed before another can
be started, one task might begin at the same time as another, or a task may have to be
repeated periodically A second type is spatial relationships in which either a task is
required to begin or end at a specific location, be accomplished in a place relative to where
another task is being performed (e.g., conduct close air support near a maneuvering
friendly force) or perform a task at multiple locations (e.g., deploy various ships in a fleet
at different locations). Operations templates for mobilization planning and mobilization






Develop and evaluate installation





Develop and exercise RC unit and
individual mobilization plans
SN 7.1.1
Issue top-down strategic guidance
SN 1.1.2
Determine possible closure times
SN 6.1.3
Participate in joint operation planning
to support mobilization
SN 7.1.2
Develop joint and service vwfighting




Alert units and individuals of
impending mobilization
SN 7.1.3
Determine needs and solutions
SN 1.2.2
Provide forces and mobility assets
SN 7.1.4
Document requirements and solutions
SN 7.3.1







Assemble forces and report status
SN 7.3.3
Develop and document unit
SN 6.4.1
Develop requirements movement pla
fromHStoPOE
SN 7.4.1





Conduct objective (constrained) force
planning
SN 6.5.2
Validate RC units for deployment
SN 7.5.1
Determine global theater support force
structure and strategic mobility
requirements
SN 7.5.2





Conduct trade-off and prioritization
SN 7.7.1
Coordinate JMETL development
Figure 2. Mobilization Planning Operations Template
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B. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
A major hurdle in developing post exercise analysis methodologies for
mobilization planning by a Joint staff is the concept of a significant event. Significant
events are classified not only according to significance but also in terms of strategic,
operational, and tactical considerations. An example of a strategic significant event would
be an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or a Blue force counter-offensive An example of an
operational significant event would be the joining of a mechanized infantry battalion with
its equipment shortly after entering the theater An example of a tactical significant event
would be an infantry platoon engaging an Iraqi force The analysis in this thesis is
primarily concerned with the relative location of friendly and enemy forces, therefore, an
example of a significant event would be a change in a Red or Blue unit location or
strength In each of these cases the degree of significance has to be determined based on
its contribution to the overall success or failure of a specific strategic, operational or
tactical mission.
C. METHODOLOGY
A problem with measuring a joint staff's performance based solely on the outcome
of significant events is that it involves the assumption that units arrive exactly according
to the TPFDD. Unfortunately, due to the stochastic nature of warfare, this is not the
case. In reality, units do not arrive in the sequence planned by the joint staff, but either
17
are delayed or arrive early Units can be detained at POE's, be delayed due to weather or
simply never arrive (i.e. attrition of shipping by enemy submarines). If units arrive early
they may cause congestion at their POE, affecting forces arriving later
A methodology for evaluating a mobilization plan must capture the synergistic
effects between forces on the battlefield at any particular time caused by the stochastic
nature of a CAX. Each arriving unit contributes to the overall force readiness in a
different way For instance, the absence of a certain logistic unit will adversely affect the
combat effectiveness of the forces it supports. An analogy can be drawn to a chess game,
where the outcome of the game can be different depending on which pieces are present,
because each piece contributes differently This thesis seeks to demonstrate a
methodology that captures the total force readiness based on both the strength and
location of friendly and enemy forces. To fully measure the relative strength of Blue vs.
Red, aggregate measures were developed which capture the spatial and temporal
relationships between opposing forces The friendly and enemy forces must first be divided
into two sets One set consists of forces already present in theater when the game begins
and the other consists of forces that arrive in theater during the CAX. For each set
contained in the Red and Blue forces (i.e. Red 1, Red 2, Blue 1, Blue 2) a strength
weighted center of mass (centroid) is calculated. The relative location ofRed and Blue
weighted centroids can be analyzed over a period of time to show relative force strengths
and can be used as a measure to determine the effectiveness of a particular mobilization
plan Similarly this methodology can also be applied to the entire Red or Blue force. A
18
discussion of potential measures developed through application of this methodology













Table 3. Definition of Variables and Indices
1. Calculation of Unit Strength
JTLS represents each individual unit as an entity which is described in terms of its
attributes. One of the attributes is the status of the Combat Systems possessed by the
unit. JTLS Combat Systems represent weapons such as tanks, fighting vehicles, artillery,
and support assets such as combat and service support equipment and personnel . Ground
units consume supplies, which need to be resupplied. If a unit does not have sufficient
supplies, its Combat Systems' performance will be degraded or the unit will be rendered
incapable. An example ofhow logistics can affect a unit's combat effectiveness is when
they run out of fuel. When an M-l tank reaches zero fuel state, its combat effectiveness
is reduced to 60% as opposed to a 155 self-propelled howitzer which is reduced to 98%.
Similar degradations of combat systems are represented for other Combat and Service
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Support Functions This information is stored in the Combat System characteristics array
A small sample of the Combat System Characteristic Array for several arbitrarily chosen















INFANTRY 15 1 0.3 1 1.0 6
155 SP
HOWITZER
30 7 18.6 2 0.98 6





Table 4. Example of Combat Characteristics Array
JTLS models attrition using Lanchester equations Column 5 of Table 4 lists the
attrition coefficients with 1 representing direct fire, 2 for indirect fire, and indicating a
system that is a non-attritor. One noteworthy observation is that although a tanker truck
will never cause attrition, it can be a potential target, subject to attrition from the opposing
side. Furthermore, although the tanker truck does not cause attrition, it does contribute to
the overall effectiveness by providing fuel to the systems which do cause attrition As
evidenced previously with the example of the M-l tank, non-attriting systems contribute
to combat effectiveness indirectly through the systems that they support.
JTLS reports a unit's current strength in terms of percent capable To determine
the strength at any given time the unit's full (or 100%) strength must be calculated and
multiplied by the percent capable available through the post-processor. Table 5 illustrates
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how full strength for a unit containing the listed Combat Systems is calculated Column 2,
the number of each combat system, is the number the unit is authorized at the start of the
game Simply multiplying the number authorized by the value of an individual system and
summing over each combat system gives the value of a unit's full strength. In this
example the unit's full strength is 1500. At any time during the game this unit's current
strength can be attained by multiplying its percent capable by 1 500.
NAME NUMBER VALUE NUMBER*VALUE
INFANTRY 500 1 500
M-1TANK 17 30 510




C3 1 100 100
1500
Table 5 . Example Combat System Structure
2. Weighted Centroid
For each set, i, of a force, j, a weighted centroid is calculated at time, t, using
equations (1) and (2), based on the position and current strength of units contained in












where k = l,...,kg
,
the number of units in set i, of force j
3. Distance between Weighted Centroids
As Blue units arrive in theater they change the relative distances between Blue and
Red weighted centroids Examining the movement over time of the relative positions of
weighted centroids can provide insight into the effectiveness of a mobilization plan.
Examples of movements of Red and Blue Centroids are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
A single figure is not used because of the fidelity required to illustrate the movements of
centroids in response to changes in location and strength of Blue and Red units. At any
given time, once the locations of the Red and Blue centroids are known, the algorithm for
calculating Great Circle distances across the earth contained in JTLS is easily adapted and
used in a spreadsheet to calculate the distance between the two centroids, which is then
plotted over time. Examination of the distances between centroids over time provides
insight into the effectiveness of a mobilization plan. Similar to how the outcome of a chess
game is dependent upon what pieces are present on the board at any given time the
outcome of a battle is dependent upon what mix of forces are in theater and their
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This chapter demonstrates an application of the practical methodology for
evaluating the effectiveness of a mobilization plan as described in Chapter HI. Specifically
it shows that a simulation can furnish the data necessary to develop meaningful measures
of performance in a relatively simple manner with very few calculations It is important to
emphasize that this thesis is not intended to demonstrate tactics or to evaluate the
performance of the computer model Figures 8 through 19 which show how the distance
between the strength weighted centroids ofthe opposing sides change over time, are all
provided at the end of the chapter to facilitate the multiple comparisons required.
A. SCENARIO
Essential to a successful CAX is a well planned scenario The first step in
developing a scenario is to decide what effects are being sought and determine what
composition of forces on both sides will be necessary to bring about these effects. Once
the desired effects are created, data are extracted and the methods discussed in Chapter
III are applied. The scenario developed for this demonstration was designed to create




Two scenarios were developed based upon a Major Regional Conflict (MRC) in
Southwest Asia One scenario is called Heavy and the other Light Each scenario has two
variants. In variant 1 ( i.e. Heavy 1 and Light 1), arriving Blue forces are delayed from
reaching their assigned sectors within theater. In variant 2 (i.e. Heavy 2 and Light 2),
arriving Blue forces are not delayed and reach their assigned sectors in theater as planned
One instance of each scenario and variant was simulated using primary combat units (i.e.
infantry, armor, ships) and their associated logistical support elements. As mentioned in
Chapter IE, Blue and Red forces were partitioned into two sets each. Set 1 represents
forces positioned in theater at the beginning ofthe game and Set 2 are the forces which
arrive during the game
C. HEAVY SCENARIO
1. Heavy 1
At the start of this scenario, Iraq (Red) has moved south with the immediate
objective of seizing the Trans-Arab pipeline. Red forces have displaced all Gulf Coalition
(i.e. Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian ) or Green forces from Kuwait. The Iraqi forces have
taken up defensive positions north ofKing Khalid Military City (KKMC) and along the
Kuwaiti-Saudi-Arabian border in the east Blue (US, UK and Coalition ) forces in Set 1
are shown in Table 6, while Red forces in Set 1 are shown in Table 7. In this scenario,
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all Red forces are present at the beginning of the game, therefore, there is no Red Set 2.
Blue Set 2 is shown in Appendix A Figure 5 shows all forces present at the start of the
game Note that the green icons represent Coalition forces, blue represents US and UK
forces and red represents Iraqi forces For this particular application, the term Blue






































Table 7. Red Forces in Set 1 for Heavy 1 and Heavy 2
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Figure 5. Initial Force Locations at Start ofHeavy 1 and Heavy 2
One hour into the game the 2nd Brigade of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division
(2/24 Mech) and 3 rd Brigade of the 101 st Airborne Division (3/101 ABD ) arrive and have
been joined by their subordinate units. The 2/24 Mech begins to move toward KKMC
and the 3/101 ABD begins to move towards Khafji in the north. The 2/24 Mech is slowed
by Red airstrikes as it moves west.
Blue forces arrive into theater unhampered until 281400ZDEC90 when the port at
Dhahran is hit with an aerial attack. This causes units arriving through this port to be
processed slower than usual for the next 12 hours because of the damage to the port's
Material Handling Equipment (MHE). A queue builds up as units wait at the port to be
29

processed. As MHE is repaired, units waiting are processed according to their priority
assigned intheTPFDD.
Shortly into the second day the Iraqi 17th Armor Division begins to withdraw after
an engagement with Coalition forces leaves them severely damaged Two other
significant events occur on the second day. One is closure of the 1 st Brigade of the 101*
Airborne Division (1/101 ABD ) and 1* Brigade of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division
(1/24 Mech) and their movement toward Khafji and KKMC respectively The other is a
Red attack on the USMC units in the east By midday enough Blue units have arrived to
begin counterattacks in the West north ofKKMC and in the east near Khafji.
By the beginning of the third day, Red forces in both the east and west have been
damaged to the point where they begin to withdraw. By midday, Blue forces have
pushed Red forces out of Kuwait and continue to pursue them until the end of the game.
2. Heavy 2
This scenario allows Blue forces to arrive in theater and deploy to their assigned
positions without interruption. Red forces take no offensive actions and thus allow the
Blue forces to establish the tempo of engagements The port at Dhahran is not damaged
and therefore forces arriving through Dhahran are not delayed The Iraqi 17 Armor
Division is stopped by Blue air attacks before it can engage Blue forces in the west.
Midday on the third day, Blue begins its counterattack in the north and west. By
late in the day, the Red forces begin to withdraw and Blue forces pursue them with results




Figures 8 through 13 show how the distance between strength weighted centroids
ofBlue and Red forces changes throughout the Heavy scenarios. Figures 8 and 1 1 are for
Set 1
.
Figures 9 and 12 are for Set 2 and Figures 10 and 13 are for the entire Blue and
Red forces. By comparing and contrasting the displayed results, insight into how effective
a particular mobilization plan was in moving forces into theater in relation to the opposing
forces can be gained In particular, times at which a significant change in the direction of
the strength weighted centroid indicate potential critical event occurrences The causal
reasons for this change would then be investigated using methodologies described in
References 1 through 6.
In Heavy 2, because the Red forces took no offensive action prior to the Blue
counter-offensive, the curve in Figure 1 1 is flat until approximately 60 hours, into the
game, which coincides with the time the Blue counter-offensive happened. During a
similar period in Heavy 1, the engagement between the Iraqi 17
th Armor Division and the
Gulf Coalition forces in the west is manifested by the behavior ofFigure 8. The two
strength weighted centroids get closer during the battle and then open up as the 17
th
Armor Division begins to withdraw. Intuitively, this comparison makes sense, because
one would expect a flat curve during a period when nothing significant is happening as in
Figure 1 1 and behavior like Figure 8 during an engagement and withdrawal.
Examination ofFigures 8 through 13 reveals different behavior for each scenario
during Red's withdrawal. In Heavy 2, which occurred approximately 66 hours into the
game, the distances increased (Figure 13) while during Red's withdrawal in Heavy 1,
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which occurred approximately 48 hours into the game, the curves were either flat or
decreasing (Figure 10). This can be explained by the fact that 48 hours into Heavy 1, Blue
forces were still transiting from their points of entry and therefore skewed the strength
weighted centroid away from the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), while in
Heavy 2 all forces had already transited from their points of entry to a position close to the
FEBA prior to the Red withdrawal
D. LIGHT SCENARIO
This scenario also begins on 280000ZDEC90 In this scenario, the Red forces
have not entered Kuwait, but are only threatening to invade US forces are able to flow
into Doha, Dhahran, and King Fahd International Airport (KFIA). At the beginning of the
game, two Marine Expeditionary Units are poised near Doha, the 3 rd Brigade ofthe
101
st
Airborne Division (3/101 ABD) is moving north toward Kuwait, and the 2/24 Mech
is moving west towards KKMC. Initial force locations are shown in Figures 6 and 7.
Red and Blue Set 1 and Set 2 forces are shown in Appendix A
1. Light 1
Forces flow into theater unhampered for the first 5 hours of the game until
airstrikes again damage port operations The results are similar to Heavy 1 in that arriving
forces are detained at the port while MHE is repaired Red initiates an offensive 18 hours
into the game, long before all Blue forces have arrived in theater The 3/101 ABD
32













Figure 7. Initial Force Locations for Light 1 and Light 2 Near KKMC
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Figure 7. Initial Force Locations for Light 1 and Light 2 Near KKMC
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Blue forces already in position, coupled with arriving Blue forces, are able to hold off the
Red attack. Red forces begin to withdraw between 24-30 hours into the game and are
pursued by Blue forces
2. Light 2
This scenario is very similar to the one previously discussed with the major
difference being that the port operations are not hampered and thus the majority ofBlue
forces are able to flow into theater before the onset of hostilities. The helibome assault is
also not conducted which allows the Red forces deeper penetration into Kuwait Similar to
Light 1, Red forces are repulsed out of Kuwait and pursued into Iraq
3. Discussion
Figures 14 through 19 show how the distance between strength weighted centroids
ofBlue and Red forces changes throughout the two scenarios Figures 14 and 17 are for
Set 1 Figures 15 and 18 are for Set 2 and Figures 16 and 19 are for the entire Blue and
Red forces
In these particular scenarios, there was little difference in the outcome or in the
flow of battle within the theater caused by arriving forces. In Light 1 the hostilities begin
before the majority ofBlue forces have arrived, while in Light 2 hostilities begin soon after
the majority ofBlue forces have arrived in theater. However, Blue participation in the
significant engagements of the campaign were for the most part limited to Set 1 . The Red
offensive 18 hours into the game is evidenced by the steep decline in Figure 14, but after
that Figure 14 and Figure 17 appear to be very similar. Examination of Figure 15 and
Figure 18 reveals that both curves are almost the same shape and cover a very similar
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range. The major difference between the two curves is that the downward sloping portion
is shifted to the right approximately 18 hours, which corresponds closely with the time
that several ofthe Set 2 units were delayed Examination of Figure 16 and Figure 19
shows a similar relationship to the previous discussed curves
Another noteworthy observation is from Figures 17 through 19 where it can be
seen that the Red penetration into Kuwait was deeper than in Light 1 as shown in Figures
14-16, possibly due in part to the lack of a Heliborne assault in Light 2 This reveals that
the methodology developed in this thesis has other possible applications in examining
effectiveness of operational maneuver similar to CPT Kevin Brown's thesis [Ref. 4]
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has demonstrated several possible insights into the effectiveness of a
particular mobilization plan. The methodology is intended to provide for post exercise
analysis by examining, over time, how the relative strength weighted centroids of opposing
forces move This methodology is similar to taking a series of snapshots over time of a
chess board and displaying graphically how the two sides compare relative to each other.
This experiment conducted using JTLS has established how, with only limited interaction
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Figure 10. Distance Between Weighted Centroids of All Opposing Forces for Heavy 1
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Distance Between Weighted Centroids ofBlue Set 1 and Red Forces for
Heavy 2
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Figure 16. Distance between Weighted Centroids of All Opposing Forces for Light 1
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Figure 19. Distance Between Weighted Centroids of All Opposing Forces for Light 2
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This research has provided a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of a
mobilization during a computer aided exercise. The methodology presented does not seek
to assign values to each individual joint mobilization task stated in the UJTL, but instead
seeks to determine how the outcome of significant events was impacted by the mix of
forces present in theater and their location relative to the enemy at the time the event took
place. The first step in the implementation of the methodology is to partition the opposing
forces into sets. Once the sets have been identified, the methods described in
Chapter III can be applied It is important to note that this methodology can be applied
to any set of units regardless of side or faction. Lastly, by creating graphs similar to
Figures 8 through 19 distance between the strength weighted centroids of any two sets of
units can be observed over time, allowing the user to determine how effective the arrival
and placement of forces on the battlefield has been.
One strength of this methodology is that it is relatively simple , but retains the
robustness to be applicable in many different scenarios. Because it is simple to
implement, it allows for quick analysis that can easily be presented in post exercise
debriefings. Another strength is that it requires no special player interactions with the




Another possible application of the model is to explore how effectively forces are
employed once in theater. For example, if the arriving units are given orders to proceed
to a position where there is no enemy threat or given orders to proceed to an area where
an enemy threat does exist, the changing location of the strength weighted centroid
relative to the opposing force would provide a good indication of the overall effectiveness
of the movement orders In other words, just as it is important to know if the right mix of
forces is on the battlefield, it is important to determine if they were utilized properly. It is
recommended that this methodology be applied in conjunction with that presented in CPT
Kevin Brown's thesis [Ref 4].
Because JTLS is an event driven, discrete time simulation, changes in strength and
location are sent to the post processor as shown in Appendix C. This methodology uses
both current strength and position and it becomes quite cumbersome When either
strength or location changes, it is necessary to sort through the other post processor file
in order to match up the current pair (strength and location). It is not very difficult to
write computer code to search each post processor file for the data that are needed and
then merge the two files, but it is time consuming. The sorting and merging consumes the
bulk of the time when applying this methodology. If strength and location could be linked
so that if either one changed, they would be both be sent to the same post processor file,
then the amount of time needed to apply this methodology would be significantly reduced.
For example the entire methodology could be applied using a spreadsheet package in a
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timely enough manner to be useful in a post CAX debrief before all of the important
players have dispersed.
This thesis must be viewed as part of the whole effort to evaluate overall
performance of a Joint Staff. This thesis, along with the theses mentioned in Chapter I,
addressing operational maneuver, force protection, operational firepower and short term
logistic support of amphibious operations as well as those previously completed
concerning theater logistics and intelligence tasks provide the baseline for future efforts to
develop a standard methodology for evaluating Joint Staff performance. Standardized
methods for evaluating the decision making process of a Joint Staff will provide a causal




APPENDIX A. FORCES IN SET 1 AND SET 2
The spreadsheets contained in this appendix show the units in the sets

























































Blue Forces in Set 2 For Heavy 1 and Heavy 2
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Unit Country
10MXINBD S a ud Arabia











8M XINBD Saud Ara b ia
E AARE AC M D Saud Ara b ia









NO AREACM D Saud Ara b ia
NODIVCMD K u w a it
NW AREACM D Saud Ara b ia






















































































Red Forces in Set 2 for Light 1 and Light2
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APPENDIX B. TUP SCORES USED IN JTLS
The data in the following spreadsheet are taken from the On Line Players Manual
in JTLS. The number represents the overall firepower score for a unit using any of the 84
prototypes This score is not used in determining battle outcome, but does impact on the
capabilities and resupply of a unit. These scores are the values discussed in the
development of unit strength and are aggregated for all systems in the identified unit
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TUP# PROTOTYPE SCORE





4 MECHBN3 I 2874
5 INFBN.1 2040
6 MFBNJ 1557





12 ADAINF 1 754
13 OISCOM IN 1746
14 STC0 1 543
IS HHAVNBN 1 6134
16 HHAVNBN2 640





20 AHAVNBN 2 1040
21 NAVAIR 1 1330
22 MARAIR 1 1540
23 AFAtR 1 2833
24 AIRLIFT.1 2033








33 ABNDIVHQ 1 466
34 ASLTDVHQ 1 468
35 ABNBD€HQ 1 207
36 ASLTBDHQ.1 207
37 ARBOEHQ1 207
36 MXBOEHQ 1 207





















60 AIRCAVSQ 1 6075
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APPENDIX C. SAMPLE INPUT FILES FROM POSTPROCESSOR
This information is representative of the input files received from Rolands and Associates.
The files were prepared by opening them in a spreadsheet and removing excess columns
and characters A sample from each of the location and strength files is included The
input files ranged in size between 3000 to 48000 bytes.
Location File:
Game Time Unit Type Unit Latitude Longitude Force Side
2.635056 2 VII-300004 30.84368 46.2272
2.635812 2 VII-300004 30.91667 46.16667
1.5 1 VIICORPS 27.49725 48.51149 1
1.5 1 VIIFA 27.48891 48.5088 1
1.8 1 XVI 1 1ABC 27.41667 48.26667 1
2 1 XVIUFA 26.39403 50.05986 1
2.5592 3 ZSU-13 29.98023 47.34838
2.5592 3 ZSU-13 29.98023 47.34838
2.576049 3 ZSU-13 29.87511 47.30228
2.576049 3 ZSU-13 29.87511 47.30228
2.583366 3 ZSU-13 29.7712 47.30788
2.583366 3 ZSU-13 29.7712 47.30788
2.600228 3 ZSU-13 29.72952 47.43303
Strength File:
Game Time Unit T>pe Unit Strength
0.001 1 JFCMD.KU 99.43
0.001 1 KAHUINBDE 99.89
0.041667 1 KHARG.BTY 99.88
0.041667 1 KU.FORCES 99.83
0.041667 1 MADINAH 99.47
2.791689 1 MADINAH 95.13
2.833356 1 MADINAH 94.23
2.875023 1 MADINAH 83.46
2.91669 1 MADINAH 61.29
3 1 MADINAH 50.32
3.000024 1 MADINAH 39.68
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APPENDIX D. STRENGTH WEIGHTED CENTROID
CALCULATION
The spreadsheet below shows the Strength Weighted Centroid calculation at a 6 hour
checkpoint for a particular set of units. In this case the set shown is Blue Set 1 in Light 1
at 90 hours into the game
Time | unit Lot Long Full Str %Str ft Str Strength Strengthlat STrength*Lon£
3.75J10MXINBD 29 0131875 45 418157 25061 99 41 9941 24913 1401 722809 6049 1131508 908
3 75J11MXINBD 28 8896769 46 3173995 30195 99 33 9933 29992 6935 866479 2246 1389183 567
3 75 13MEUSOC 30 028944 46 998745 5417 92 93 9293 5034 0181 151166 2476 236592533
3 75 1ARDIV.UK 28 546375 45 655342 24947 99 47 9947 24814 7809 708372 0411 1132927 309
3 75 1DSBN 28676945 46 826111 1748 999 0999 1746252 50077 17256 81770 18999
3.75j20INBDEMX 29 0602966 47 5598833 30157 99 39 9939 29973 0423 871025 4992 1425514394
3 75 24DISCOMF 29 31568 47 6864254 1748 99 52 9952 1739 6096 50997 83836 82955 76342
3 75|24MEUSOC 29 8379584 46 8864957 5417 95 53 9553 5174 8601 154407 2604 242631 0558
3.75'2BDE24MX 29 6801475 46 9047942 25061 98 45 9845 24672 5545 732285 0568 1157261 091
3 75 2DSBN 28 9030595 47 1656697 1748 99 9 0999 1746 252 50472 02546 8236314504
3 75 2INDIV UK 28 6091352 45 948447 18971 95 79 9579 181723209 519894 3855 834989 9237
3 75 3UKSPTBN 28 9108369 47 597179 1748 999 999 1746252 50485 60676 83116 66902
3 75 8MXINBD 29 0698108 44 9066334 31153 99 39 9939 30962 9667 900087 5838 1390442 595
3 75 EAAREACMD 29 0812321 44 894298 468 998 998 467 064 13582 79659 20968 5104
3 75 EADIVCMD 28 9617051 47 8247533 17197 99 53 9953 17116 1741 495713 5867 818576 8038
3 75 HMH-461 29 3333333 4825 1540 99 89 9989 1538 306 45123 64262 74223 2645
3 75 HMH-463 29 25 48 3666667 1540 99 89 9989 1538 306 44995 4505 74402 73358
3 75 HMM-162 29 25 48 3666667 1540 99 93 9993 1538 922 45013 4685 74432 52745
3 75 HMM-261 29 3333333 4825 1540 99 93 9993 1538922 45141 71195 74252 9865
3 75 HQ24MECH 29 728611 47 297501 868 99 54 09954 864 0072 25685 73395 4086538141
3 75JHQ3BDE101 29 4800841 46 9212603 7920 99 49 9949 7879 608 232291 5065 369721 138
3 75IMSSG 13 29 645 47 695 10434 98 84 09884 10312 9656 305727 8652 491876 8943
3 75 MSSG.24 29 635 47 609 10434 998 0998 10413 132 308593 1668 495756 8014
3 75 NOAREACMC 29 0812321 47 444 486 998 998 485 028 14105 21184 2301 1 66843
3 75 NODIVCMD 29 6737948 47 5063199 29776 99 51 9951 29630 0976 879237 4361 1407616 895
3 75 NWAREACMC 28 8463711 46 9282848 18550 99 26 9926 1841273 531140 4425 864077 8374
£ strength*lat= 8092101 962
E strengthIon J= 12969533 68
I strength = 277510 8651




APPENDIX E. DISTANCE BETWEEN WEIGHTED CENTROID
CALCULATION
The spreadsheet below shows the calculation for the distance between Strength Weighted
Centroids for Blue Set 1 and Red Setl in Light 1. Blue lat, Blue long, Red.lat and
Red. long refer to the lat-long of the Strength Weighted Centroid for each force. Figures
8 through 19 are created by plotting time vs. distance.
Time Blue lat Blue.long Red.lat Red. long Distance
6 28.88877 46.81569 29.9973 47.21696 127.888
12 28.88878 46.81571 29.9973 47.21696 127.886
18 29.15526 46.83107 29.9973 47.21696 99.7381
24 29.15766 46.84603 29.9973 47.21696 98.9698
30 29.17192 46.84106 29.9823 47.20185 95.6171
36 29.17195 46.84094 29.98185 47.20304 95.6132
42 29.17195 46.84094 29.98373 47.20329 95.8146
48 29.17195 46.84094 29.97857 47.20351 95.2934
54 29.17183 46.84074 29.90018 47.31938 92.3147
60 29.17325 46.74429 29.85489 47.23749 88.6308
66 29.14227 46.65746 29.76138 46.92274 72.7081
72 29.14214 46.6573! 29.79617 46.82237 73.68
78 29.15312 46.63386' 29.79228 46.81061 72.3365
84 29.15196 46.63193 29.79494 46.81133 72.8047
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